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11 Come sit at my knee 
And talk of poli cy 11 
That less than heroic couplet may correspond to the public's view of the 
basic relationship between the President of the United States and his Council 
of Economic Advisers. But it hardly describes the reality or complexity of 
the role of the CEA. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that the 
conduct of the CEA in practice often differs substantially from the general 
expectation of its performance. Let us explore some of the reasons why this 
situation obtains. 
First of all, picture a decision-making process in which a wide and 
varying assortment of official and informal groups and individuals provide 
advice to the President. After all, few economic questions are devoid of 
political, social, or foreign policy implications, and most non-economic 
issues-- domestic and international --contain some significant economic 
aspects. 
Thus, not many decisions in governmental policymaking are made solely or 
even primarily on the basis of economic analysis or information from 
economists. On the other hand, few such decisions are so devoid of economic 
premises or consequences that economic expertise is irrelevent. 
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Secondly, it should be recognized that whose advice the President follows 
at any given time and on any specific issue depends on a large and varying 
number of factors. These range from the desires of the chief executive to the 
ability and past relationships of his other advisers to the requirements of 
the circumstances. For example, several CEA chairmen with strong backgrounds 
in government regulation participated actively in policymaking in that area, 
while others concentrated more on tax matters. 
Thirdly, the formation of public policy takes place at many levels. 
Interagency committees are constantly meeting, with differing mandates to 
develop, recommend, review and, sometimes, approve policy. Meetings are the 
basis-- and bane-- of a bureaucrat's existence. It is at this level that 
many advisory units exert their greatest influence. 
These meetings, of course, are not open to the public. On occasion --
far too numerous for the orderly conduct of government -- a version of the 
results is 11 leaked 11 to the press by an interested party. This garbled report 
may come to represent the public's understanding of what has occurred. I am 
reminded of the Japanese movie Rashomon, in which the viewer sees the story 
successively from the different viewpoint of each of the participants. In 
that case, however, they all 11 leaked. 11 
Fourthly, the public role of the Council of Economic Advisers is normally 
the proverbial tip of the iceberg. Usually, the CEA chairman is expected to 
develop public understanding of and thereby enhance the popular support for 
the President's economic program. Yet some of the most successful chairmen 
kept the lowest profiles, avoiding speechifying and press conferences. 
The notion that CEA chairmen often use the bully pulpit to publicly 
educate the President and his administration is a figment of the imagination. 
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CEA chainnen have normally conducted their intellectual battles inside 11 the 
family ... Occasionally, a CEA member may get in front of current 
administration policy, but that is done with the knowledge that he or she was 
walking down a dangerous path, and that any trial balloon launched may easily 
be popped. 
In effect, there is a trade-off-- between sounding off in public and 
being an effective member of the Administration's decision-making process in 
private. Recent experience has underscored the existence of this tradeoff, 
although most CEA chairmen have instinctively sensed the nature of the subtle 
relationships involved. 
The Role of the Chairman 
With this extensive introduction, I would now like to present my 
understanding of the key aspects of the role and function of the chairman of 
the Council of Economic Advisers. As you may know, a reorganization plan in 
1953 lodged all of the authority of the council in the chairman and specified 
that he (or she) would be the link to the President. 
1. To advise the President on the course of the economy. This is the 
only statutory function assigned to the Council of Economic Advisers, aside 
from the writing of the Economic Report. A rather vague statement of 
authority is contained in the CEA's charter, the Employment Act of 1946. 
In addition to sending him a regular flow of analytic reports, the CEA 
chairman alerts the President to impending releases of economic news. Thus, 
the evening before the Consumer Price Index report for a given month is 
issued, the President has on his desk a memo from the CEA chairman setting 
forth the highlights and often suggesting how the White House could respond to 
press i nq ui ri es. 
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At times the President will call for amplification. For example, 
President Reagan and I had a pleasant-- but spirited and extended --
difference of views on the matter of seasonally adjusted versus unadjusted 
reports on employment and unemployment. We ultimately resolved this matter by 
my providing him both sets of data, together with suitable caveats. 
Of course, the direct contacts with the President are of very special 
importance. Because of the confidential nature of the role of trusted adviser 
I will treat this aspect very lightly. When I joined the Administration, I 
decided not to keep a diary or write memoirs. The opportunity cost seemed too 
high in view of the wide array of policymaking activities I was involved in at 
the time. Some of my colleagues in the Administration, with large support 
staffs, obviously decided otherwise. 
As an example of the advice to the President, I do recall discussing the 
subject of gold with him on several occasions, a matter that he himself had 
studied at some length over the years. During the 1980 presidential campaign 
and earlier, he had indicated strong interest in restoring the gold standard. 
As a member of the Gold Commission (set up under a 1980 law), I told him that 
I would pursue the matter with an open mind. Subsequently, we reported that 
the majori~ of the Commission opposed a return to gold. That disposed of the 
rna tter. 
Similarly, I often wound up urging the President and other senior members 
of the Administration to keep our disagreements with the Federal Reserve 
System within the government. It became clear, I thought, that financial 
markets were reacting badly to almost any Administration statement on monetary 
policy that remotely could be considered critical of the Fed. In any event, I 
had frequent opportunities to present our views to Fed chairman Paul Volcker 
on a one-to-one basis. 
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These two episodes are examples of the CEA 1 s function of taking advantage 
of the opportunity to help the President avoid economic harm. 
2. To participate in top level decision-making on economic, budget, and 
financial policy. Typically, the chairman of the CEA participates in numerous 
high level formal (e.g. cabinet) and informal (e.g. budget policy) meetings at 
which the President reviews or makes policy decisions. The effectiveness of 
the CEA on any specific issue depends in large part on the cogency of its 
analysis. 
But that is not always the case. For example, in 1981, we won the battle 
to eliminate import restrictions on shoes, but lost the struggle to contain 
restrictions on imports of textiles. Quite candidly, I did quite a bit of 
politicking on these issues, occasionally obtaining aid from cabinet members 
that I had supported on other matters. But I doubt that it was merely 
coincidental that the Congressional delegation to the Hhite House which 
successfully urged textile quotas was led by a senior southern Republican who 
was diligently working for the enactment of the President•s program, while the 
unsuccessful shoe delegation was chaired by a prominent Northeastern liberal 
Democrat. 
The determination of the economic assumptions to be used for making 
revenue and expenditure estimates is a key and early aspect of the annual 
policy cycle. In early 1981 especially, as we were fleshing out the details 
of Reaganomics, I found myself in recurring battles with both supply-siders 
and monetarists. I still vividly recall the fervor of those doctrinal 
disputes, which at times bordered on the theological. For example, my 
insistence that a modest period of recession would accompany the imposition of 
monetary restraint was viewed by the supply-siders as a lack of faith in the 
instantaneous nature of the economy•s response to the tax cuts. 
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I interpreted the ro 1 e of the chairman of the CEA not as a means of 
preaching supply-side economics or monetarism, but rather of helping the 
President develop and carry out his economic program. Thus, the economic 
assumptions we adopted were a compromise which satisfied neither the 
monetarists nor the supply-siders. It is fascinating to note that the more 
modest economic scenario that I settled for was simultaneously attacked by 
many of the supply-siders as far too pessimistic and by most private 
economists as wildly optimistic. Subsequently, I reported to the President 
that I had converted an economic scenario which was "off-the-wall" to one that 
\-Ja s merely 11 Way out. " 
In the Reagan Administration, the main role of the CEA has not been to 
develop additional, brave new programs, but to operate what we called an 
economic damage-limitation mechanism. Thus, the CEA is expected to, and 
predictably does, oppose each and every proposal to subsidize some segment of 
the economy, or to shield a specific industry from competition. 
We did not win all of these battles during my term of office, but each 
proponent of additional government involvement in the private sector knew that 
he or she would have to do battle. At times, a Cabinet member proposing some 
additional form of government intervention in the economy would start off by 
saying, 11 Mr. President, Murray will probably give you a different view, 
but 11 
3. To supervise the preparation of the Economic Report. The President's 
economic message, usually written by the CEA, has for many years been quite 
short. The great bulk of the document consists of \tJhat is technically the 
Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers. This is a joint effort of 
the three members of the Council and the entire Council staff; at least that 
is the procedure that I follawed. 
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In the case of the 1982 report, all three members of the Council saw it 
as an opportunity to explain the Reagan economic philosophy and program to the 
public and to the economics profession. Although the reaction in the 
professional journals was mixed, virtually all commentators concluded that we 
succeeded in focusing the central thrust of the Economic Report on 
Reaganomics. 
The Annual Report also provides some opportunity to raise new issues and 
to move policy along. For example, it was widely known in Washington that I 
had advocated making sizeable reductions in the rapidly expanding military 
budget. This was a subject area in which I had done research for over two 
decades. The 1982 Economic Report was, I believe, the first one that raised 
serious questions about the economic feasibility of the defense program of the 
Administration then in office. 
4. To administer the Council of Economic Advisers. The work of the CEA 
is carried on in an atmosphere of professionalism and, in large measure, 
nonpartisanship. As is customary with a change in administration, I inherited 
the staff recruited by my Democratic predecessor. Except for career 
statisticians and secretaries, the staff traditionally consists of non-career 
appointees, most of whom are on leave from their respective universities and 
research institutes. I found each one of them a loyal and dedicated 
professional economist. In fact, I asked several of them to stay on beyond 
their initial appointments. 
Few people outside of Washington appreciate how small the CEA is in 
relation to its large mandate. Its staff of 30-40 includes economists and 
statisticians, as well as secretarial and support staff. In terms of size, 
the CEA is dwarfed by the thousands of economists employed in the Departments 
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of Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, and State. Personally, it hurt to administer 
a 12 percent budget cut to what was already the smallest CEA staff in over a 
decade. Nevertheless, as I explained at the time in a speech to the American 
Council on Education, 11 the republic will survive and even prosper. 11 
The chintzy budget for the CEA makes the chairmanship both intellectually 
stimulating and physically grueling. It did give me an opportunity, however, 
to one-up the Hashington press corps on one occasion. At a joint press 
conference with then Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan, we were asked to 
comment on the high cost of the government chauffering senior government 
officials from their homes to their offices and back. My response, which 
disposed of the rna tter at the time, was that I gave the subject a great deal 
of thought on the bus on the way to work that morning! 
5. To participate in international economic policymaking. There is an 
important international dimension to economic policy. A wide array of 
ambassadors and economic and finance ministers from other nations frequently 
come by the CEA for discussions ranging from the courtesy call to the 
substantive. The chairman of the CEA carries at times a significant 
representational load. For example, he also serves as chairman of the U.S. 
delegation to the Economic Policy Committee of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development. It is also customary to elect the chairman of 
our delegation chairman of the OECD Economic Policy Committee. 
This activity provides a good opportunity to work with counterparts in 
other nations to develop positions and draft communiques, much of which can 
serve as preliminary input to planning for the annual economic summits. I 
found the many informal discussions at OECD meetings helpful in giving the 
President an indication of the current thinking on the part of other 
countries. 
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6. To serve as an administration spokesman to Congress, the n~dia, and 
the public. Following the release of the Reagan Administration's proposed 
economic recovery program in 1981, the CEA chairman became one of the three 
major 11 Sal esmen .. (a 1 ong with the Treasury Secretary and the Budget Director) 
for the President's economic program-- aside from the .. number one 
communicator .. himself. There followed an almost endless array of joint and 
individual congressional testimonies and press conferences; White House 
briefings to the Cabinet, other officials, and numerous visiting interest 
groups; and speeches to all sorts of organizations -- business, consumers, 
agriculture, ethnic, regional, religious, etc. 
It reached a point that, when I was out for a meal and the waiters began 
to clear the tables, I automatically got ready to stand up and speak. As I 
had participated in developing the 1981 economic program, I initially felt 
very comfortable in carrying out this high-priority presidential assignment of 
economic 11 marketi ng... In 1982, as the gap between the execution of the policy 
and its original enunciation widened very substantially, I reduced my public 
involvement. In August 1982, with the prospect of having to defend extended 
triple digit deficits, I quietly returned to my academic position. 
Conclusions 
If there is any dominant characteristic of the Council of Economic 
Advisers it is that, on virtually all issues reaching the President, it does 
not represent any specific constituency. Unlike each of the departments and 
major agencies, the CEA carries little if any special-interest baggage and 
thus it is a good proxy for the public or consumer interest. In the upper 
reaches of any administration, there are few centers of analysis or advocacy 
with that substantial amount of detachment. 
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The President benefits from the CEA's independent voice, to the extent 
that he listens to it. Surely the need is compelling for high level decision 
makers to hear and consider views that avoid easy answers and that pose 
difficult problems of choice. 
It is hard to ascertain the specific influence that a given Council 
of Economic Advisers or its chairman exerts on national policy. All senior 
appointees -- be they Cabinet officers or White House officials -- believe 
that their contributions are central, and many of them can be expected to 
denigrade the role of others. I claim no exception from this mortal 
shortcoming. Also, other former CEA chairmen would likely provide very 
different viewpoints, based on their respective expectations and experiences. 
How much of a successful economic policy (however measured) can be 
attributed to the CEA then in office is of course a rna tter of judgment. But 
the same holds true for less happy economic outcomes. Ideally, we would like 
to know the difference between actual economic performance and what would have 
occurred in the CEA's absence. I am not aware of any analytical mechanism 
available to accomplish this task, however. Any outsider inevitably relies on 
a sample of impressionistic and anecdotal observations. 
I returned to the private sector with no grand lessons. I came away 
grateful for the opportunit¥ to speak my mind and to know that decision makers 
in government were listening to at least one economist before making up their 
minds. 
